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Chapter 5
Pension Reform and Gender Inequality
Michelle Dion

This chapter examines an effect of pension reform that was largely unanticipated, or at least seldom explicitly considered, when many pension reforms
were being adopted throughout Latin America: the effects of privatization
on women’s welfare.1 Though this issue was largely absent in early reform
debates, academic researchers and international organizations—including
the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission on Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), and
even the World Bank—began to consider it in the early 2000s.2 Although
the literature is increasingly recognizing that pension policy design produces different distributional outcomes according to gender, it often disagrees in its evaluation on whether these outcomes are generally negative,
positive, or neutral for the welfare of women. These disagreements have
come about because some analysts view publicly mandated pension systems
as serving an insurance function, though often not explicitly, while others view them as serving a redistributive function. From these different
perspectives derive different criteria to evaluate gendered outcomes of
pension privatization, which explains why assessments of the gender effects
of pension privatization differ.
This chapter has three objectives regarding the gendered outcomes
of structural pension reform in Latin America. First, it provides a brief
overview of the sources of gender inequalities and discusses elements of
pension policy affecting gendered welfare. Second, it explains and critiques
the insurance-based criteria for evaluating the gender effects of pension
reform. These criteria, often employed by economists, emphasize lifetime
benefits, actuarial fairness, or consumption outcomes. Third, it offers an
alternative set of criteria for evaluating gender outcomes based on three
dimensions: women’s ability to claim social citizenship rights, gender stratification, and the distribution of welfare responsibility among the market,
state, and family. These criteria are consistent with a sociological understanding of public pension systems as welfare or redistributive state policy.
The author thanks Christina Ewig, Evelyne Huber, Stephen J. Kay, Milko Matijascic, Jenny
Pribble, Tapen Sinha, and John Williamson for comments and suggestions, and she accepts
responsibility for any of the chapter’s remaining shortcomings.
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Finally, it compares interpretations of the gendered effects of pension
reform in Latin America based on insurance and distributive assumptions
to illustrate why disagreements in the literature persist.

Labor Market and Pension Policy as Sources of
Gender Inequalities
Labor market differences and pension policies often both contribute to gender differences in access to and generosity of pension benefits (Bertranou
2006; Mesa-Lago 2006; James, Edwards, and Wong 2008). In Latin America,
women’s participation in the labor market often differs from that of men in
four ways that have important effects on their ability to earn pension rights
and benefits comparable to those of men.
1. Despite increasing rates of women’s employment throughout the
region, women still tend to have lower economic activity rates than
do men (see Table 5-1). This difference can be attributed to women’s
reproductive and caring responsibilities and has an important impact
on the accumulation of contributions required to receive either a
statutory minimum pension or pension benefits comparable to those
of men.
2. When women do enter the labor force, they often experience higher
levels of unemployment than men (Giménez 2005: 61–2; see also
Table 5-1). Higher unemployment levels also lead to lower contribution rates to publicly mandated pension systems.
3. Labor markets in Latin America tend to be segmented by gender,
and women are more likely to be concentrated in low-productivity,
or informal and low-quality, jobs (see Table 5-1). Consequently, they
are much less likely to have social insurance coverage or to make
regular contributions to voluntary public social insurance schemes.
Women’s segmentation in the labor force also contributes to lower
average wages for women compared to men.
4. Women’s wages at all ages and levels of education are lower than
men’s, a situation reflecting both the segmentation of women’s
employment and wage discrimination (see Table 5-1 and Sinha and
de los Angeles Yañez 2008).
Together, these differences in women’s labor market participation patterns
lead to lower contribution densities and benefits in any kind of pension system, including publicly mandated pension systems for women as compared
to men.
Given these differences in the labor market for men and women, pension
policies can either translate or mitigate these labor market inequalities into
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Table 5-1 Gender Inequalities in the Labor Market (1989–2004)
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b Income differential among wage or salary earners, calculated as the quotient of average female income and average male income, multiplied by
100.
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differences in pension welfare. Four aspects of public pension policy play
important roles in determining women’s access to and quality of pensions
(Bertranou 2006; Mesa-Lago 2006).
1. Because women on average earn less than men do in the labor market,
they more often earn the minimum pensions guaranteed by the public
pension system. Where reforms have increased the number of years of
contributions to be eligible for the minimum pension, such reforms
are more likely to affect women, who less often meet the minimum
contributions necessary to qualify for the minimum pension.
2. The way in which the pension benefit is calculated can have important
effects on women’s versus men’s pensions. If benefits are calculated
over lifetime contributions, as they are in DC systems, the system
is likely to compound the labor market inequalities experienced by
women. In contrast, women’s benefits are more likely to be more
comparable, though still probably less, to those of men under DB
plans that use either average wages or wages during a particular period
to calculate the pension benefit. Likewise, a more generous minimum
pension can also mitigate gender inequalities.
3. The use of gender-specific actuarial, or life tables accentuates gender
inequalities in pension benefits because women tend to live longer
than men. When gender-specific life tables are used, a man and
woman with similar contribution densities, wages, and retirement ages
will receive different pension benefits because it is assumed that the
woman’s benefits will be distributed over a longer period due to her
higher life expectancy.
4. Earlier permissible retirement ages also tend to result in smaller pensions for women in DC pension systems.
Though the design of pension policy can mitigate the gender inequalities
created by the labor market, analysts disagree on whether pension policy is
the appropriate tool for addressing labor market inequalities. Those that
emphasize the insurance functions of public pension policy tend to be
skeptical of using policy to promote gender equality, while those that view
pensions as having a redistributive social function emphasize the necessity
of designing policy to mitigate market inequalities. Because each of these
perspectives includes different assumptions about the role of pension policy, it is no surprise that disagreements persist regarding whether pension
privatization in Latin America has improved or worsened women’s old-age
welfare. The next section explains the insurance approach to pensions and
argues that though the insurance approach is often couched in language
of ‘fairness’, such claims are based on a misplaced emphasis on efficiency
and are actually unfair to women.
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Pensions as Insurance: The Use of Lifetime Benefits,
Actuarial Fairness, and Consumption Criteria
Some of the recent literature on structural pension reform and gender
(including James, Edwards, and Wong 2008) has been written by economists who approach the question of the effects of pension privatization on
women’s welfare in Latin America using economic or insurance criteria
that are presented as value-neutral but that actually prioritize efficiency
over equity. The two most common criteria from an insurance approach
used to evaluate the gender effects of structural reform emphasize either
lifetime benefits and actuarial fairness or comparable consumption during
old age for men and women due to intrafamily transfers.

Lifetime Benefits and Actuarial Fairness
Some economists, particularly those working with the World Bank, use
lifetime benefits as their preferred metric to evaluate the actuarial fairness
of pensions. Lifetime benefits are the average accumulated benefits of a
retiree between retirement and death, and pensions are actuarially fair to
the extent that contributions are closely linked to risks and therefore to
the cost of benefits. Actuarial fairness is used to evaluate pensions because
pension designs that do not use all available information to estimate risks
and closely link contributions to benefits can result in keeping those with
shorter longevity from participating in pension programs, leaving only the
‘bad risks’ (those with greater longevity) insured. When pensions are not
actuarially fair, resources are inefficiently allocated because when some
individuals contribute more than they receive in benefits, they cannot use
those resources for other productive purposes. This emphasis on the insurance function and efficiency of public pension systems and the importance
of comparing lifetime benefits is apparent in the World Bank’s Averting
the Old Age Crisis (1994). For instance, the book argues that a system that
privileges insurance and saving over redistribution has advantages, such
as reducing evasion, promoting employment, and promoting efficiency
(1994: 76). It also argues that many DB pension systems, though progressive in the structure of their monthly replacement rates, are actually
regressive because the rich tend to outlive the poor (WB 1994: 10).3
Redistribution, according to the Averting the Old Age Crisis model, should
only be administered through minimum safety net pensions for the elderly
poor.
Regarding gender, economists regularly use lifetime benefits to measure the actuarial fairness of pensions between men and women. Because
women tend to live longer than men, if monthly benefits for men and
women are equal, then women will have larger lifetime benefits. Some
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argue, therefore, that when contributions and benefits are not closely
linked, women will take advantage of the disparity and contribute as little
as possible, and men will cease to participate because the system is actuarially unfair (Schwarz 2006).4 If women, on average, live longer than men,
then to be fair their contributions to the pension system beyond those for
the minimum pension should be comparable to the cost of their greater
longevity (Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003a: 257–8).
Recent studies also use comparisons of women’s and men’s lifetime
benefits to assess the gender impacts of pension privatization in Latin
America (James, Edwards, and Wong 2003, 2008). For instance, James,
Edwards, and Wong (2008) find that though female-to-male lifetime benefits fall for single women and men, female-to-male lifetime benefit ratios
improve when the redistributive pillar or provisions, such as flat-rate or
minimum-guaranteed pensions, are included (in Argentina and Mexico)
and when survivor’s pensions are included (in Argentina, Mexico, and
Chile). Under certain circumstances, women may receive lifetime benefits that exceed those of men, according to the authors’ simulations.
That is, the generosity of women’s lifetime benefits is partly because of
their average longevity, not because they enjoy a comparable level of welfare to men. In this way, the study authors can present a more positive
interpretation of the gender effects of pension reform in Latin America
compared to comparisons based on the gender disparities in monthly
benefits.
Though the use of lifetime benefits and actuarial fairness is often invoked
in the use of technical, presumably value-neutral criteria for evaluating
pensions, the use of these criteria to evaluate pension reforms prioritizes
efficiency over equity. Perhaps more problematic is that using lifetime
benefits, and thus implicitly actuarial fairness, to evaluate the gender effects
of pension reform can be used to hide discriminatory practices. Indeed, the
use of gender-specific actuarial tables for the calculation of pension benefits
is not allowed in the USA precisely because the Supreme Court ruled
that they violated the Civil Rights Act 1964 and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act 1972 in Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v Manhart
in 1978. The basis of this decision was an argument that it was unfair to
discriminate against an individual of a group based on the characteristic of
the group (Simon 1988). That is, although women generally live longer
than men, it would be unfair to discriminate against those women who
do not.5 This theme is a recurring one in the literature criticizing the use
of lifetime benefits or actuarial fairness to evaluate gender and pension
reform (Fultz and Steinhibler 2003; Ginn 2004: 7). By using lifetime benefits to compare the pensions of women and men, some analysts distort the
distributional effects of pension reform in a way that minimizes the harm
done to women’s welfare and equal rights.
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Others argue that though women may have greater longevity, sex is
hardly the only, or even best, predictor of risk. It is unfair for women to be
punished for an immutable group characteristic like their greater longevity
when other predictors of risk are routinely ignored (Simon 1988; Fultz and
Steinhibler 2003; Myles 2003: 267; Ginn 2004: 7). For instance, race may
be a useful predictor of longevity but to use it to calculate pension benefits
would be considered discriminatory. Further, many of the best predictors
of risk are class-related or behavioral, rather than immutable, and continue
to be ignored, including income, occupation, education, smoking, weight,
regular exercise, and so on. Fultz and Steinhibler (2003) most clearly
make this point when they argue that even in privatized systems, publicly
mandated pension systems serve the public function of risk pooling and
therefore pooling should occur across all risks, including those associated
with gender.
In addition to gender-based discrimination through the use of lifetime
benefit or actuarial fairness criteria, several authors provide compelling
reasons why women should be entitled to higher lifetime benefits than men.
For instance, in heterosexual couples, women who outlive their partners
may not only have to care for their ailing partners but also then lack
such care themselves at the ends of their own lives or have to get it from
the state or market. In such cases, it is unclear that quantity of life is an
advantage if the quality of the longer life is poor (Ginn 2004). In such
circumstances, men are not just subsidizing the income of women but
compensating them for either caring responsibilities or the burden of living
longer.
The most compelling argument against using lifetime benefits and actuarial fairness to evaluate the gender effects of pension reform rests on the
logic that such practices reinforce discrimination against a group (women)
unable to change the characteristic on which the discrimination is based.
This was the logic of the Manhart decision in the USA and recent directives
in the European Union that reject the use of gender-specific actuarial tables
as gender discrimination. If policy in advanced industrialized democracies
rejects the use of actuarial tools as being discriminatory against women,
lifetime benefits and actuarial fairness—similarly biased criteria that accept
discriminatory practices on technical grounds—should not be used to
evaluate the gender fairness of pension reform. As Simon explains, ‘The
point is that practices, such as the one in Manhart that treat the gender
difference as unproblematic, make it more difficult for the uprooting of the
habituated gender assumptions to unfold. This, and not hidden prejudice,
makes the actuarial use of gender for insurance purposes unacceptable’
(1988: 796). In other words, using lifetime benefits to evaluate gender
outcomes only serves to perpetuate and legitimize discriminatory practices
in public pension policy.
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Survivor’s Benefits, IntraFamily Transfers, and Consumption
Averting the Old Age Crisis does a fair job of highlighting the special needs
of elderly women, including widows, who are most likely to be poor and
dependent on family members for support in old age. Despite a balanced
discussion of the poor treatment of widows in rural India and the risks
of relying on informal support networks for women’s old-age welfare, the
report emphasizes formalizing intrafamily transfers by splitting contribution credits and providing survivor’s pensions rather than promoting policies to ensure women’s entitlement to their own benefits. The book’s principal recommendations for protecting women’s old-age welfare include a
universal minimum pension without regard to employment, splitting of
contributions of married couples, mandatory survivor benefits, and additional benefits for the very old (WB 1994: 252–3). The first of these recommendations would do the most to reduce gender inequalities. Unfortunately, some of these recommendations were not uniformly or consistently
implemented in many Latin-American pension reforms.
Despite apparent concern for the gender effects of structural pension
reform in Averting the Old Age Crisis, recent evaluations of the gender effects
of Latin-American pension reform sponsored by the Bank downplay the
negative effects by focusing on informal and formal intrafamily transfers.
For example, Parker and Wong (2001) find that elderly men and women
in Mexico tend to have similar levels of consumption, despite the fact that
fewer women have access to their own pensions. Because elderly women
received income support from their family relationships, they conclude
that the reformed system does not necessarily fail them. Others emphasize
formal intrafamily transfers through the requirement that husbands purchase joint annuities with survivor’s benefits (James, Edwards, and Wong
2003, 2008). According to such defenders of structural pension reforms,
intrafamily transfers and transfers due to public benefit pillars support the
claims that women have gained more from the reforms than men have
(James, Edwards, and Wong 2008). In fact, access to own pensions for
women has declined and the inequality of monthly benefits and family
dependence has increased.
Unfortunately, reliance on intrafamily transfers for women’s old-age
welfare also entails certain costs if considered from the point of view
of gender-egalitarian values. Such transfers reinforce male breadwinner
norms, especially when restrictions are placed on the ability of women
to provide comparable survivor benefits to their husbands, as in some
Latin-American countries. Further, such benefits ‘reproduce personal relationships of power and dependence among family members’, a situation
that helps maintain the traditional division of labor (Leitner 2001: 103).
When women derive their rights to pension benefits primarily from their
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roles as mothers or wives, their dependency diminishes their worth and
equality (Sen 1984; Marco 2002; Ginn 2004). In addition, by reinforcing
male breadwinner norms, widow’s pensions provide little reward to married
women who enter the formal labor market.
Perhaps more problematic is that an emphasis on widow’s pensions
ignores the reality of changing family structures in Latin America. Over the
past few decades, marriage rates in many Latin-American countries have
declined, especially among lower-income families (see Table 5-2). In the
context of serial monogamy or unmarried partnerships, survivor’s pensions
are outdated tools for ensuring women’s welfare in old age (Schokkaert
and Van Parijs 2003b: 278; Ginn 2004: 5). Though some reformed pension
systems in Latin America allow unmarried heterosexual partners to claim
survivor’s benefits, these women must often provide proof of cohabitation
and the mutual parentage of their children. For example, in most reformed
systems, women can claim survivor’s benefits if they can prove they had a
child with the pensioner. When there are no children, women may have
to prove economic dependence on or cohabitation with the pensioner for
a minimum number of years, ranging from two years, as in Colombia and
Costa Rica, to five years, as in Argentina and Mexico (Giménez 2004: 127–
30). For low-income women, for whom cohabitation has historically been
and continues to be more common, such requirements are likely to limit
their ability to receive survivor’s benefits. Divorce and single-female-headed
households have also become more common throughout Latin America
(see Table 5-2). Divorced women who have expected widow’s pension benefits may be denied such benefits if their former partners remarry. For these
reasons, Averting the Old Age Crisis (1994) recommends splitting pension
contributions and credits between husband and wife at divorce, though few
reformed pension systems in Latin America adequately protect women’s
share of pension rights. Consequently, many of the reformed systems, by
relying on survivor’s pensions to provide for women’s welfare, are likely to
leave growing numbers of women unprotected and dependent on social
assistance in old age.

Insuring Individuals or Families?
Insurance approaches to evaluating pension reform tend to emphasize
either individual lifetime benefits and actuarial fairness or intrafamily
transfers to ensure against risks. These two positions are inconsistent in
their assumptions about the appropriate unit of analysis or comparison—
individuals or the family. On the one hand, actuarial fairness requires that
individual benefits and incentives be efficient and closely link contributions
to benefits. On the other hand, intrafamily transfers through survivor’s
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pensions provide little incentive for women to contribute to their own pensions. The position is problematic because individual fairness is used to justify policies that hurt women’s rights, and then the negative effects of these
policies are assumed to be ameliorated by policies that expect women to
receive benefits from family members rather than from individual entitlements.

Pensions as Redistributive Welfare Policy:
Alternative Criteria for Assessing Gender Impacts
Though economists tend to emphasize the insurance function of public
pension policy, sociologists and political scientists evaluate policy outcomes
from a different perspective, one that prioritizes the distributional consequences of different public policies instead of economic efficiency. Recent
research from this perspective suggests that most welfare policies can be
usefully compared along three dimensions: social citizenship, stratification,
and the role of family, market, and state in the provision of welfare (EspingAnderson 1990). Further, the gender impacts of welfare policy can be
evaluated using gendered, or gender-sensitive, versions of these dimensions
(Orloff 1993; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999). This section focuses on
how these gendered dimensions can be adapted to evaluate the gender
impact of pension reform in Latin America, arguing that these criteria
provide a superior metric for such evaluations.6

Social Citizenship
Marshall (1950) explains the extension of citizenship rights in modern society as a process concurrent with industrialization that led to the granting of
first civil, then political, and, finally, social rights to citizens of the modern
nation-state. The replacement of poor relief with modern social safety nets,
including pensions, reflects the development of individual social citizenship rights. In practice, social citizenship rights in a pension system can
be measured according to the extent that they provide benefits to enable
retired persons to live independently and maintain a socially acceptable
standard of living, and that the right to a pension is based on citizenship
rather than employment.7 Most of the pension reforms and privatizations
in Latin America have followed the World Bank model to varying degrees
by shifting the bulk of pension provision from DB to DC models, and
critiques of these pension reforms often focus on the tightening of the
relationship between contributions and benefits, which they say erodes
social citizenship rights (Giménez 2005: 45–6).
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The gender effects of policy can be evaluated according to the extent to
which reforms disproportionately affect women’s abilities to claim pension
benefits as a right of social citizenship. Policies that promote women’s social
citizenship ‘guarantee women access to paid employment and services that
enable them to balance home and work responsibilities’ (Orloff 1993:
317). Preschool or daycare, home-help for elderly family members, and
gender-neutral parental leave are examples of such policies (Orloff 1993;
O’Connor 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999). For pensions to be gender-neutral
with regard to social citizenship, the minimum contributions to receive
benefits or a minimum pension should not disproportionately disadvantage
women, and women should not be concentrated among the recipients of
poor relief or assistance pensions, a situation that implies a weaker claim
to citizenship rights (Leitner 2001: 104–5; Marco 2002). Women should
be able to claim pensions as a matter of right rather than on the basis of
their roles as wives and mothers (Orloff 1993: 315; Giménez 2005: 46). The
effect of many of the Latin-American pension reforms since the 1990s has
been to erode women’s social citizenship rights by increasing barriers to
pensions.
Many reforms in Latin America increased the minimum contributions
necessary to receive minimum guaranteed pensions, which is likely to deny
disproportionately women their social citizenship rights. For example, Mexico increased contribution requirements from 10 to 25 years; the Dominican Republic went from 15 to 25 or 30 years; Chile and Argentina went
from 10 years to 20 and 30, respectively (see Table 5-3). Given women’s
lower workforce participation rates and concentration in informal and
low-productivity sectors without social insurance coverage, these increases
in the contribution requirements disproportionately prevent them from
claiming pension rights. According to simulated women’s workforce participation in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, women’s lifetime contributions
are likely to range from 17 to 36 years across the three countries (James,
Edwards, and Wong n.d.). In all three countries, only ten years of contributions were needed under the old system to receive pension benefits, and
the simulated contributions would have been sufficient for women to enjoy
pension benefits of their own. In Chile, nearly all women are expected to
have lifetime contributions that guarantee a minimum pension because the
contribution requirement was raised only to 20 years. In Mexico, however,
the contribution requirement was raised to 25 years, which puts it just out
of range for most women, who tend to work 19–24 years. Only the most
educated Mexican women are expected to work long enough to receive
the guaranteed minimum pension.8 In Argentina, the new requirement
of 30 years of contributions to receive the flat pension benefit effectively
excludes all but highly educated women, according to simulated contribution estimates. In contrast, simulated men in all three countries were
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likely to contribute at least thirty-five years, and often longer, across all
educational groups (James, Edwards, and Wong n.d.).
Because many of the reformed systems are too young to provide firm
evidence for evaluating the gender effects of reform, research must rely
on labor market data often collected prior to the reforms and simulations
based on such data. This is particularly problematic since pension reforms
were expected to provide incentives for formal sector employment and
contributions that cannot yet be evaluated.
On the one hand, reform advocates argue that the higher contribution
requirements for minimum pensions are likely to provide incentives for
women to work and contribute longer, enabling them to earn their own
pensions in greater numbers. They also say that reforms often eliminated
the rules that provided disincentives for married women to seek formal (as
opposed to informal) sector employment, such as the provision in Mexico
that now allows women to provide social insurance benefits for an unemployed husband. Therefore, even though women are unlikely to earn their
own minimum pension benefits if their work patterns remain unchanged,
according to reform advocates, the pension reforms may create sufficient
incentives for women to change their work habits to bring them in line with
the requirements for a minimum or flat pension.
On the other hand, trends in women’s labor market participation and
preliminary evidence from Chile, which has the oldest reformed system
in the region, suggest that estimates of women’s pensions on the basis
of simulated work experiences are overly optimistic. For instance, James,
Edwards, and Wong (2008, n.d.) do not have actual contribution densities
for men and women who work. For their simulations, they assume that
when women are working, they are also contributing to social security,
though women’s employment patterns in the region suggest that a good
proportion of women, especially at lower levels of education, are likely to
be concentrated in the informal sector without social security coverage.
This means that the authors have probably overestimated the accumulation of contributions for women, especially those with less education.9
Furthermore, evidence from Chile demonstrates that women are less likely
to be affiliated to the pension system, continue to have lower contribution
density rates than men, and are more likely in surveys to overestimate their
contributions than men. Women continue to represent over 70 percent of
the population not affiliated to the social security system in Chile (Bravo
et al. 2006).10 According to estimates based on self-reported and actual
contributions by men and women to the privatized pension system in Chile,
women’s self-reported mean months of contributions is only 73 percent of
that of men, and women’s actual mean number of months of contributions
is 70 percent of that of men (based on the table ‘Contribution Patterns to
the Chilean Retirement System by Sex, Age, and Education’, in Arenas de
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Mesa et al. 2008). This is consistent with recent estimates that indicate that
the average man’s contribution density in Chile is 60 percent, compared to
only 43 percent for women (Bravo et al. 2006). By age 40, working women
will have contributed less than half as many years as working men (Arenas
de Mesa et al. 2008).
This evidence suggests that pension reform alone does not provide
enough incentive for women to seek formal sector employment to receive
pension benefits. Further, women’s self-reported contribution rates tend to
exceed their actual contributions more than men’s self-reported rates (Arenas de Mesa et al. 2008). This means that it is likely that simulations based
on household surveys (e.g. those by James, Edwards, and Wong 2008) overestimate the contributions that women are making to their pension funds
and therefore provide overly optimistic characterizations of women’s access
to pension benefits in the reformed systems. Though reformed pension
rules may create incentives for women to change their labor market participation to secure their access to benefits, evidence from Chile suggests that
women’s labor force participation combined with reformed pension rules
will continue to prevent many women from earning their own guaranteed
minimum or flat-rate pensions in many reformed systems in Latin America.
Despite the incentives created by the pension system, women may still face
structural barriers to formal labor market participation. To the extent that
women are less able than men to claim their own pension benefits due to
the new contribution requirements, women’s social citizenship rights are
jeopardized.
Pension reform supporters also claim that women’s welfare is protected
by public pillars or noncontributory social assistance and survivor’s pensions (James, Edwards, and Wong 2008). Several countries with reformed
pension systems have implemented noncontributory social assistance pensions or reduced benefit contributory pensions for the very old (see Table
5-3). In terms of social citizenship, universal, noncontributory pensions
would provide the most complete social citizenship rights and gender
equality. In the Southern Cone, reduced benefits at age 70 were adopted
for workers who either have contributed fewer years than the regular retirement benefit or meet a means test. Given their work histories and longevity,
women are likely to be concentrated among the beneficiaries of these social
assistance pensions (Bertranou 2003). However, when the benefit levels of
noncontributory or social assistance pensions do not meet basic needs or
are significantly less than the minimum pensions of workers, noncontributory pensions are more consistent with poor relief and do not reflect
full social citizenship rights. That is, if the benefits of such pensions are
significantly lower than other minimum guaranteed pensions for workers,
the higher concentration of women among recipients of social assistance
pensions implies that women are not entitled to full citizenship rights and
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equates women, due to labor market segmentation and discrimination or
their caring responsibilities, with needy groups otherwise unable to provide
for their own welfare.
Supporters of structural pension reform also emphasize that married
women will benefit from new requirements for joint annuities and survivor’s pensions that were adopted with many reforms (James, Edwards,
and Wong 2008). From a social citizenship rights perspective, conditioning
women’s pension benefits on their dependency or family roles erodes
their citizenship rights to a pension as autonomous citizens (Leitner 2001;
Giménez 2005). Though women may be entitled to social assistance or
survivor’s pensions in reformed pension systems, the benefits of those
pensions may be insufficient to ensure that women are able to maintain
a decent standard of living or a standard of living consistent with full social
citizenship. In many reformed systems, social assistance pensions are less
than the minimum pension of wage earners or may not be sufficient to
maintain a household above the poverty line.
Policies to promote women’s full social citizenship with regard to pensions can address the differences in labor market participation between
women and men or compensate women for their caring responsibilities. Labor market policies could include those that support women’s
employment (such as daycare services) or counteract wage discrimination and labor market segmentation faced by women. Such policies are
likely to require long-term investments and be of limited immediate
effect. Pension policies likely to have more immediate effect on women’s
social citizenship include adjusting contribution requirements for minimum pensions to be within reach of the majority of women, protecting women’s access to partner’s pensions through pension contribution
splitting, and providing women with credits and contributions for their
caring responsibilities. Women’s access to the minimum-guaranteed or
flat-rate pensions is very sensitive to the number of years of contributions required, which is illustrated by the contrast of Chile’s twenty-year,
Argentina’s thirty-year, and Mexico’s twenty-five-year requirements (James,
Edwards, and Wong n.d.). Working women will be much more likely to
meet Chile’s minimum requirement of twenty years than those in either
Argentina or Mexico. For the financial soundness of the pension systems, contribution requirements must be increased, but the increases
can be done such that they are less likely to disproportionately hurt
women by taking into account existing patterns of women’s workforce
participation.
Women’s rights can also be protected by ensuring that women who
have not worked outside the home receive credit for their partner’s contributions should the union dissolve (Schokkaert and Van Parijs 2003b).
For example, recent reforms to marriage law in Chile have not provided
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protection for divorced women, who may lose their survivor’s benefits
should their former spouse remarry. Finally, women’s caring responsibilities can be acknowledged by providing contributions (or at least credits toward minimum contribution requirements) to women’s individual
accounts. Examples of such credits are common in Latin America. In
Uruguay, a 1920s law guaranteed a mother’s right to a pension after working in the labor market only ten years. In Brazil, women automatically
receive five years of credit toward requirements to receive a pension. Such
credits are not uncommon in European social security systems and would
help ensure that women are able to claim their own minimum guaranteed
pensions (Leitner 2001; Ginn 2004).

Gender Inequality and Stratification
Stratification refers to the extent that welfare regimes eliminate, perpetuate, or create inequalities in society. Though social policies may redistribute income, they can also potentially stratify social groups in terms of
status and rights (Esping-Andersen 1990: 56–8). For instance, regimes with
several occupationally distinct public pension or health insurance systems
reinforce the existing hierarchy among different occupational groups. In
Latin America, social insurance systems are highly stratified, especially due
to the existence of separate and more generous social insurance systems
for public sector employees and the military. Pension privatization exacerbates existing stratification when public sector employee, military, or police
schemes are exempted from reform, as in most Latin-American countries.
Since most of the pension reforms in the 1990s shifted DB to DC funding,
the new pension systems perpetuate stratification or inequalities in the
labor market. Though postreform pension systems often have some mechanism for redistribution to support low-income pensioners, the amount of
redistribution is often limited.
Social insurance rules can also affect gender stratification, with the
potential to either mitigate or exaggerate existing gender inequalities in
the labor market (O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999: 31–2). As explained
above, women’s labor market participation differs from that of men in
Latin America because women participate at lower rates, are more likely
to be unemployed or segmented in low-productivity or informal sectors,
and face wage discrimination (see Table 5-1). To evaluate gender-based
stratification after pension reform, the differences between women and
men’s old-age welfare should be compared following the reform. Genderstratifying pension policy will compound the inequalities between men
and women produced by the labor market. In this case, monthly rather
than lifetime benefits are the appropriate comparison because the value
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of monthly benefits determines differences in consumption, standard of
living, and economic independence.
Based on various estimates of the ratio of women’s to men’s monthly
benefits, structural pension reforms implementing DC pillars are likely to
increase gender stratification in old age. For example, according to simulations by James, Edwards, and Wong (n.d., Table 7.1), ratios of women’s
to men’s monthly own-pension benefits including minimum guaranteed
pensions or flat-rate benefits are 0.21–0.54 in Argentina, Mexico, and
Chile. The most equitable own-monthly pension benefits are in most cases
concentrated among the most highly educated women. According to simulations by Rofman and Grushka (2003: 44), the difference between the
replacement rates of monthly benefits of single women and men grew
substantially after Argentina’s reform. At the same time, married men who
are required to buy a joint annuity benefited very little from the reform,
are not much better off than single women, and are much worse off than
single men. Alternative simulations for Chile provide slightly more optimistic estimates of the ratio of single women’s monthly benefits to those
of men, especially if women are assumed to prolong their work (Arenas
de Mesa and Gana Cornejo 2003). Depending on the assumptions of the
simulations for replacement rates under the reformed DC systems, gender
ratios for monthly benefits can vary greatly. In almost all simulations, however, women’s own-monthly pension benefits are less than those of men
with comparable education and contribution histories.11 Further, these
gender differences are often greater than those that occurred under the
unreformed systems.
The disparity between men’s and women’s monthly benefits is not only
due to labor market inequalities but is also compounded by particular
aspects of reformed pension policies. In general, the largest source of
benefit difference derives from the calculation of benefits over the entire
contribution life of the worker (one of the key features of DC reforms),
which does little to ameliorate labor market inequalities. This explains why
differences in labor market participation, rather than actuarial tables and
retirement ages, is the largest source of the difference in women’s and
men’s monthly pension benefits (Wong and Parker 2001). An alternative
to the gender stratification common with reforms using DC individual
accounts is the contrasting case of Brazil, which tightened the link between
contributions and benefits in its 1998 reform (see Matijascic and Kay 2008).
Despite this tighter link, Brazil’s new system is likely to yield less gender
stratification than DC-reformed systems. Brazil gives women credit for five
years of contributions toward time of service pension requirements, and
their pension benefits are 94–103 percent of those of men at comparable
levels of income, age, and work history, according to simulations (Rocha da
Silva and Schwarzer 2003: 127). Though the tightening of the contributions
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and benefits link tends to increase gender inequality regardless of whether
DC individual accounts or notional defined accounts are used, the simulated results for Brazil suggest that reforms implementing notional defined
accounts may be less gender-stratifying than DC reforms.12 Though Brazil’s
pension system still faces many challenges (Matijascic and Kay 2008), its
reform provides an example of an alternative model that may prove less
gender-stratifying than DC reforms.13
Apart from the shift to defined contributions, many pension reforms
in Latin America allow either earlier retirement ages for women or the
use of gender-specific actuarial tables in the pricing of annuities, both of
which contribute to the lower monthly pension benefits of women. In all
the countries that enacted structural pension reforms—except for Peru,
the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Uruguay—women have the right to
retire up to five years earlier than men. When women do retire earlier,
they lose up to five years of additional contributions, which would entitle
them to higher pension benefits (assuming they have enough contributions
to qualify for at least the minimum-guaranteed or flat-rate benefits). The
effect of earlier retirement for women will result in greater gender stratification if women regularly retire early. For example, the ratios of monthly
benefits of women with average work histories to average men in Chile are
estimated to increase by 15–20 percentage points if women retire at age 65
years rather than 60 years, and ratios of women’s to men’s monthly benefits
improve 9–16 percentage points if women in Argentina delay retirement to
age 65 years (James, Edwards, and Wong 2008).
In addition to different retirement ages, the use of gender-specific actuarial tables to price annuities is allowed throughout Latin America. The
real effect of gender-specific actuarial tables on the equality of monthly
benefits is probably smaller than the inequalities created by the labor market or retirement ages. According to simulations for Mexico, using unisex
actuarial tables to price annuities reduced gender stratification less than
improving women’s wages (Wong and Parker 2001). For Argentine men
and women with equal funds accumulated in their individual accounts,
the annuity of a single woman would be about 86 percent that of a single
man, and the annuity of a married woman would be almost 106 percent that of a married man due to the use of gender-specific life tables
(Rofman and Grushka 2003: 47; see also James, Edwards, and Wong n.d.,
Table 4.9). In Chile the use of unisex life tables would tend to increase
women’s pension replacement rates by about 6 percent and reduce those
of men by about 7 percent (Arenas de Mesa and Gana Cornejo 2003:
202; James, Edwards, and Wong n.d., Table 3.9). However, the recent
government reform proposal suggests that the issue of unisex life tables
requires further study due to its complexity (Consejo 2006). Despite the
modest improvement in gender stratification to be expected from the use
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of unisex life tables for the pricing of annuities, a case for using unisex
tables can be made based on the argument that to do otherwise would
be gender discrimination (Simon 1988; see above section on actuarial
fairness).
State policy can also try to address the sources of labor market inequality
or use pension policy to redress gender stratification. Though addressing labor market inequalities would have the greatest effect, change in
the labor market is likely to be complicated and slow moving. Instead,
governments can implement relatively minor changes to reduce some of
the gender stratification currently exacerbated by the reformed pension
systems. First, policymakers can increase the likelihood that women will be
entitled to their own minimum or flat-rate pension instead of survivor’s
or social assistance pensions using the recommendations discussed at the
end of the section on social citizenship rights. Second, they can require
that the pricing of annuities be made using unisex actuarial tables, which
is the standard in many advanced industrialized democracies. Finally, they
can increase women’s retirement age to that of men to encourage women
to stay in the workforce longer to earn a minimum pension. However,
increasing the retirement age to encourage longer workforce participation
has the added risk of further eroding women’s social citizenship rights, a
tradeoff likely to be addressed differently according to prevalent patterns
of women’s workforce participation and social security contribution in each
country. In some cases, it may be possible to increase women’s retirement
wage if at the same time minimum contributions are adjusted downward
for both men and women (or women are given caring credits) to ensure
that more women are likely to meet the minimum requirement.

Welfare Role of the State, Market, and Family
Social insurance policies also distribute the responsibility for risk pooling
and welfare among the market, state, and family. Market failures and risks
can be covered by private insurance, state insurance, or family networks.
Any state policy that shifts the provision of services from families to the state
is parallel to the shift of responsibility from the market to the state (Orloff
1993: 313–14). In the case of structural pension reform, the creation of
privately administered individual accounts with DC benefits represents a
shift from the state to the market. Not only are individual retirement
accounts and annuities privately administered, but pension benefits are also
determined according to the market performance of the pension funds. In
countries where the state guarantees and funds a minimum pension for
workers whose retirement savings will not finance the minimum pension,
the state is still providing some protection from market failure. Likewise,
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noncontributory social assistance pensions, where they have been implemented, add an additional layer of state protection.
Overall, most pension reforms have shifted some risk back to workers
by requiring them to rely on the market to generate their pension savings
while only providing a minimal safety net to protect from market failures.
Because a shift back toward the market will leave some individuals exposed
to the risk of market failure, it is likely that families will also have to increase
their support for elderly family members when both the market and state
fail to guarantee sufficient income support. That is, when more workers
retire with only the minimum pension or a social assistance pension, they
are likely to depend more heavily on their families to make up the gap
between their pension support and welfare needs. Because women tend
to be the primary caregivers in most families, shifts of the welfare burden
onto families is likely to increase their work disproportionately. One consequence of this shift that has been little explored is the effect it is likely to
have on the ability of families, especially among the poor, both to provide
support for elderly family members and to invest sufficiently in the welfare
and human capital of younger family members. It would be a perverse
outcome indeed if families encouraged children to leave school to earn
enough to support elderly relatives.
In addition, many reformed systems also shift responsibility for welfare
from the state to families by increasing the role of family relationships
for the provision of women’s welfare through survivor’s pensions. Many
reforms were at least implicitly based on the nuclear family model (Marco
2002). The reliance on survivor’s pensions to provide for women’s welfare
has already been discussed with regard to women’s social citizenship and
gender stratification. With regard to the distribution of welfare responsibility among the market, state, and family, it is worth questioning again the
appropriateness of increasing the role of families at a time when family
structures and responsibilities are in flux (see Table 5-2). Given the rise
in informal family arrangements, divorce, serial monogamy, and femaleheaded households, attempts to formalize intrafamily contracts through
pension legislation seem misplaced. Pension legislation should not be used
to create incentives (or intrafamily dependency) on one particular family
model.
Responsibility for old-age welfare in these reformed systems has implicitly or explicitly shifted from the state to the family. The implicit shift
occurs because of the emphasis on the market and the likelihood that
response to market failures will now be the responsibility of families. The
explicit shift is the emphasis on survivor’s pensions for women’s welfare. As
with the other dimensions of gendered welfare outcomes, pension policy
cannot address all inequalities created by the market, but it can seek to
protect individuals in old age from market and family failures. To this
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end, pension reforms should ensure that minimum pensions and social
assistance pension amounts are sufficient to mitigate the dependence of the
elderly on their families. This is important because dependence on families
with scarce resources may create shortages for investment in younger family
members. Further, pension reforms should not rely on nor try to formalize
a traditional breadwinner family model that is becoming less common
throughout the region. Instead, benefits, particularly for women, should be
individualized and protected regardless of marriage. Finally, in the absence
of policies that ensure women’s rights to claim individual pension benefits,
legal provisions should be adopted and enforced to protect women’s claims
to pension credits or contributions in the event of divorce or separation.
This is an important concept that was included in Averting the Old Age Crisis
but was seldom implemented in practice. Such legal protections are now
being considered as part of the reform debate in Chile (Consejo 2006).

How Do Reformed Pensions Fare Using
Distributional Criteria?
Whereas the gender impact of pension reform appears positive when
evaluated using insurance and efficiency criteria, a distributional welfare
perspective suggests that such assessments are overly optimistic. Through
the lens of the distributive outcomes, many pension reforms seem to have
a negative gender impact because they decrease social citizenship rights for
women, increase gender stratification in benefits, and increase the burden
on families. Rather than mitigate gender inequalities in the labor market,
many pension reforms seem to reproduce or even amplify inequalities.
Though some aspects of reforms were intended to provide incentives for
women’s labor market participation and independence (such as provisions
for providing benefits to husbands), other aspects of reforms are likely
to reinforce women’s gender roles as wives and mothers and increase
women’s dependence on such roles for their welfare (such as survivor’s
pensions). This implies a dual system whereby the basis for men’s pensions
is social insurance and women’s pensions is charity, social assistance, or
family dependence (Marco 2002).
The use of these gendered dimensions of welfare to evaluate pension
reform in Latin America is also a useful means to estimate how pension
reforms are changing the models of welfare in the region. The three dimensions of welfare regimes used above to evaluate the gender impacts of pension reform (social citizenship, stratification, and role of the state) can also
be used to distinguish among three ideal types of welfare regimes common
in advanced industrialized democracies: liberal, conservative, and social
democratic (Esping-Anderson 1990, 1999).14 In Latin America, welfare
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policy has approximated in its design the conservative ideal type, though
with significantly lower levels of coverage in many countries (Filgueira and
Filgueira 2002; Barrientos 2005). Characteristics common to conservative
regimes are high levels of stratification and inequalities of social citizenship
rights, especially according to occupation; an emphasis on providing a minimum safety net consistent with Christian democracy; and reinforcement of
traditional family and gender roles. In many cases, Latin-American pension
reforms strengthened characteristics of conservative welfare regimes, such
as women’s dependence (Giménez 2005: 52). Other aspects of the reforms,
in particular the role of the market in providing pension benefits, are
consistent with liberal welfare regimes, moving the overall regime type
toward a conservative–liberal hybrid.

Conclusion
This chapter has explained that the source of disagreements in the literature regarding the gendered effects of pension reform in Latin America
stems from the differences in the criteria used and related normative
assumptions regarding the function of public pension policy. It argues
against the use of insurance-based criteria, such as actuarial fairness and
the use of intrafamily transfers, to evaluate the gendered outcomes of
pension reform on the basis that these criteria reinforce gender inequality
and perpetuate discriminatory practices against women. It also argues that
when viewed as redistributive welfare policy, reforms to public pension
systems, such as those adopted throughout Latin America in the 1990s,
often disenfranchise women from their social citizenship, aggravate gender
inequalities, and reinforce traditional family roles for women.
Though addressing labor market and intrafamily inequalities through
labor market or family policy would be difficult and uncertain, some
straightforward reforms could mitigate the negative effects of both the
market and current policies. For instance, the contribution requirements
for the minimum guaranteed or flat benefit pensions in privatized systems
could be adjusted to be closer to the actual workforce participation patterns
of average women at all levels of education. In most cases, the adjusted
contribution requirements would still be much higher than in the unreformed systems. Of course, such a reform would have important financial
consequences, especially when the majority of pensioners are expected
to receive state-subsidized minimum pensions in privatized systems. With
proper studies, however, it should be possible to adjust the requirements to
be within reach of most working women to provide them with incentives to
work a few years longer but without being so far out of their reach as to be
a disincentive to participate in the newly reformed public pension system

17:39

05-Kay-and-Sinha-c05

OUP137-KAY-and-Sinha

(Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 158 of 163

August 20, 2007

158 Michelle Dion

altogether. Reforms could also better compensate women for their caring
responsibilities. Contribution or credit splitting within couples would at
least give women whose primary responsibilities are in the home their own
independent claim to pension benefits without increasing dependence.
Further, contributions to their individual accounts or at least credits toward
minimum contribution requirements could be given to women for their
caring responsibilities. Finally, eliminating the use of gender-specific life
tables and equalizing retirement ages between men and women could also
improve women’s pensions in the reformed systems.
Since most pension reforms in Latin America were motivated by macroeconomic rather than distributional concerns (Madrid 2003), it is not
surprising that the gendered effects of privatization were not explicitly
considered. The recent interest in gendered effects is likely to move such
considerations onto the agenda as some countries begin to consider rereform. If the recent report of the Presidential Advisory Board on Social
Security (Consejo 2006), commissioned by Chilean President Michelle
Bachelet, is indicative of a new trend in the region, not only are future
pension reforms of privatized pension systems likely, but also gender will
be a new concern during those reform discussions.

Notes
1
Other assessments regarding the lack of gender considerations during the
reform process can be found in Marco (2002), Arenas de Mesa and Gana Cornejo
(2003), Bertranou (2003), Bonadona Cossío (2004), Marco (2004b), and Dion
(2006).
2
Some early published research on gender consequences of the Chilean reform
includes Arenas de Mesa and Montecinos (1999) and the gender effects of privatization in general (Sinha 2000). Since then, the World Bank (Edwards 2001; Parker
and Wong 2001; James, Edwards, and Wong 2003, 2008), the ILO (Bertranou 2001;
Bertranou and Arenas de Mesa 2003), the UN ECLAC (Marco 2004a), and the
International Social Security Association (Gilbert 2006) have all published studies
of the gender effects of pension privatization.
3
See also Rune (2003) for a discussion of the normative assumptions of the World
Bank’s pension reform model in Averting the Old Age Crisis.
4
This argument assumes, however, that for actuarial fairness to be determined,
men will have to complete information about not only their contributions and
benefits, but also those of women.
5
In the USA, for example, the longevity of women overlaps with that of men more
than 80% of the time; less than 20% of women are likely to live longer than men
(Christiansen 1983).
6
These gendered dimensions are consistent with many prior studies of the effects
of pension reform on women’s welfare in Latin America. This analysis simply places
pensions more explicitly within theoretical debates on gender and welfare.
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7
In the language of Esping-Anderson’s model of welfare regimes, this dimension
is de-comodification (1990, 1999: 43).
8
Often, pension reform advocates point out that the reforms are better for women
because even if they do not earn the minimum or flat guaranteed pension, they can
at least withdraw their accumulated contributions. However, this point is irrelevant
if we recall that under the previous system nearly all women who worked would contribute enough to meet the minimum contribution requirements for a minimum
pension (ECLAC 2006a).
9
According to data on the contribution densities of men and women enrolled
in the social security system, women have marginally higher contribution rates or
a higher percentage of weeks or months during which regular contributions are
made. However, this is because a higher proportion of women work only in the
informal sector and never formally enroll in the system. In contrast, men are more
likely to move in and out of the formal sector and thus are likelier to be enrolled in
the social security system even when they work in the informal sector later. These
data should not be construed to imply that women contribute at rates similar to
men.
10
It would be preferable to compare the proportions of the female and male EAP
that are affiliated to the social security system, but the summary of Chile’s Social
Protection Survey (Bravo et al. 2006) does not provide this information.
11
Arenas de Mesa and Gana Cornejo (2003: 191) summarize the results of several
different simulations of replacement rates in the Chilean system. The comparison
illustrates the sensitivity of simulated results to model assumptions regarding labor
market participation and economic growth and investment return rates.
12
Simulations by Rocha da Silva and Schwarzer (2003) also suggest that the ratio
of women’s benefits to those of men have improved at all levels of income, age, and
work history.
13
In this sense, the Brazilian case may serve to test counterfactual hypotheses
regarding gender and pension privatization.
14
Some have argued for the inclusion of additional regime types (e.g. see Huber
and Stephens 2001), but those alternatives are not discussed here.
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